A Calculated Escalation: What the Tselemti Fighting Signals for Ethiopia

• Fighting in Ethiopia’s Tselemti district has reopened a dormant front in the Tigray conflict, prompting airstrikes, flight suspensions, and renewed displacement risks.
• The clashes expose the fragility of the Pretoria Agreement, which has failed to resolve core political, territorial, and security disputes.
• Without early diplomatic intervention, the escalation could quickly widen undermining hard-won gains since 2022.

Clashes in a long-contested borderland in Ethiopia

On 26 January 2026, forces aligned with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) launched an offensive on the Tselemti district, approximately 350 km south-west of Mekelle, in Ethiopia. Currently, the area is held by local Amhara militias and a limited number of Ethiopian federal forces. Although Tselemti was administered as part of Tigray prior to the Tigray War, it remains under contested, dual administration by the federal government and the Amhara Regional State.

The initial TPLF assault was repelled. Within hours, however, a second and significantly larger offensive followed, involving heavy artillery and an estimated force of up to 25,000 fighters. Units drawn from the TPLF’s so-called Armies 13, 17, and 35 were redeployed towards Asegede, Guna, and Waldaba within Tselemti. Federal and allied forces subsequently withdrew, and much of the contested territory is now under Tigrayan control.

Airstrikes, dispersed forces, and a muted information space

Clashes are ongoing, albeit at a reduced intensity. Following the government’s withdrawal, the Ethiopian Air Force conducted multiple air and drone strikes in and around Tselemti, reportedly inflicting considerable damage on Tigrayan positions. In response, TPLF units have shifted to smaller, lightly armed formations to reduce vulnerability to air attacks.

Some TPLF elements attempted to advance into Western and Southern Tigray, including Wajirat and Raya, but encountered stiff resistance from the Tigray People’s Front (TPF), a splinter group from the TPLF, and were forced to withdraw. These units are now reportedly operating from neighbouring Afar.

Despite earlier credible reports of Eritrean commitments to actively support the TPLF, there has been no visible involvement by Eritrean forces so far. Whether this reflects a recalibration in Asmara or a temporary delay remains unclear.

At the same time, Ethiopian military forces appear to have disrupted Tigrayan supply routes by controlling key crossing points along the Tekeze River. Notably, both sides have largely avoided public coverage of the clashes in their respective media. The most tangible public impact to date has been Ethiopian Airlines’ suspension of all flights to Tigray on January 29, leaving thousands of passengers stranded.

Hardliners ascendant inside the TPLF

The escalation follows significant shifts within the TPLF/TDF’s political and military leadership. In recent weeks, moderate figures have been marginalised, removed, or detained, while hardliners have consolidated control. General Haileselassie Girmay has been appointed commander of the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF). New commanders have also been installed across the northern, north-eastern, and southern commands.

Meanwhile, the former head of the Tigray Security Bureau, General Fisseha Manjus, has reportedly been tasked with securing external support, particularly from Eritrea and Egypt, and managing relations with Fano and OLA groups. These appointments signal a clear alignment with the TPLF’s hardline faction.

The interim administration led by General Tadesse Worede appears either severely weakened or increasingly subsumed by hardline interests. There has been no visible attempt to distance itself from recent military actions.

Addis Ababa interprets Tselemti as a test run

According to federal government contacts, authorities were aware of the TPLF’s preparations in advance. The attack on Tselemti is widely viewed in Addis Ababa as a probing operation designed to test Tigrayan military capabilities and government responses.

Should the operation be judged successful, Ethiopian government sources believe the TPLF may expand operations into Western Tigray and remaining parts of Southern Tigray as early as mid-February—potentially timed to coincide with the movement’s 51^st anniversary on 18 February.

Federal restraint in publicly addressing the clashes appears deliberate, for two primary reasons. First, to assess the TPLF’s post-Pretoria military capacity amid reports of external support, including anti-drone systems; and second, to avoid triggering negative international media attention at an early stage.

Between strategic anxiety and renewed ambition

The current escalation appears to reflect both desperation and a calculated sense of opportunity. TPLF leaders reportedly received fewer political and personal incentives than expected following the Pretoria Agreement, signed in 2022. Most senior figures remain confined to Tigray, with no meaningful national political role and no representation in either chamber of the federal parliament.

Growing internal dissent within Tigray has increased pressure on the leadership to reassert relevance and authority. At the same time, perceived indicators of renewed strength, including reported external backing, coordination with Amhara militants (Fano), and the transfer of advanced weapons systems, appear to have emboldened hardliners. Faced with diminishing political space, the leadership has opted to test its leverage before it risks strategic irrelevance.

A narrow window for preventive diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy is urgently required to avoid a slide into a broader, ethnically charged conflict that would make de-escalation significantly more difficult. The African Union carries primary responsibility, as renewed fighting risks rendering the Pretoria process effectively defunct. Particular attention should be directed towards the TPLF, which is currently driving the escalation.

The wider international community also bears responsibility, despite its fragmented and increasingly inward-looking posture. Re-engaging key Pretoria stakeholders, potentially alongside additional influential actors, could help generate the political leverage needed to halt further escalation and preserve a pathway back to dialogue.

Also read: The Battle for the Red Sea: Understanding the Ethiopia–Eritrea Conflict

The post A Calculated Escalation: What the Tselemti Fighting Signals for Ethiopia appeared first on The Exchange Africa.