US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan shake hands during a meeting at Yerevan’s Zvartnots international airport on May 26, 2026. (Photo by KAREN MINASYAN / AFP via Getty Images)
AFP via Getty Images
When U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Yerevan on May 26th, 2026, and signed a strategic cooperation agreement between the U.S. and Armenia, covering energy and more, the world took notice. Rubio’s visit followed up on U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s historic visit in February of this year, in which he and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a civil nuclear energy cooperative development agreement.
The South Caucasus rarely commands attention until war breaks out, pipelines are threatened, or a great power expands its footprint.
The region has quietly become one of the most strategically competitive crossroads in Eurasia. Sitting between Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus is central to energy transit, East-West and North-South trade, and Western access to Central Asia. Much of the world’s energy security, especially European efforts to diversify supply sources, relies on energy transiting the region. For the United States, due to its proximity to Russia and Iran ties it directly to long-term geopolitical competition and the future architecture of Eurasian connectivity.
This reality helps explain why Armenia’s June 7 elections matter far beyond Yerevan. The vote will determine whether the South Caucasus continues to move toward diplomatic normalization, regional integration, and diversified economic partnerships, or reverts to the cycle of instability and dependency that long allowed Moscow to dominate the region. At stake is not only the political future of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan but also the geopolitical orientation of the entire South Caucasus.
Caucasian Competition
The South Caucasus has become an arena of overlapping geoeconomic competition among the United States, Russia, China, and Iran. Each sees the Caucasus through a different strategic lens. Russia views the region as its southern underbelly, essential to preserving its influence over the former Soviet space. Since the 18th century, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union have viewed the region as a bridgehead against Iran and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey.
Iran detests the secular Shi’a government of Azerbaijan, its close relationship with the Sunni regional power Turkey, and its cooperation with Israel, and fears the emergence of transport corridors that could bypass it and weaken its regional leverage.
The United States sees an opportunity to strengthen European energy security, deepen ties with Central Asia, add another vector to pressure Iran from the north, and reduce the coercive power Moscow derives from frozen conflicts and energy dependence.
China, meanwhile, views the Caucasus through the lens of infrastructure and trade. Beijing’s long-term interests center on creating an overland trade route from China to Europe that is not dependent on partners such as Russia or Iran, which have their own agendas. Unlike East-West shipping lanes, the overland transportation corridor is not vulnerable to hypothetical American naval interdiction.
This convergence of American and Chinese interests is a testament to the maxim “politics makes strange bedfellows.” Washington’s support for projects such as the Middle Corridor and broader regional connectivity initiatives, including the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity through Armenia, reflects a desire to secure durable access among Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. China seeks many of the same outcomes for different reasons. Both powers benefit from stability, functioning transit networks, and the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Russia and Iran benefit from the opposite.
For decades, Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus rested on unresolved disputes, military dependence, and its ability to position itself as the indispensable arbiter between hostile neighbors. Frozen conflicts, kindled by the Kremlin, created leverage and required Russian “peacekeepers.” A normalized relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly one accompanied by economic integration and expanded Western engagement, threatens the foundations of Russian regional influence.
Energy, Elections, and Russian Subterfuge
Russia, mired in the Ukraine conflict, currently lacks the military resources to immediately buttress its position in the South Caucasus. That is why Armenia’s election has become the focal point of an increasingly aggressive Russian political interference and covert action campaign. A favorable electoral outcome, achievable at comparatively low cost, could simultaneously reassert Moscow’s influence, buttress Iran, threaten American and European energy initiatives, and ensure China doesn’t have too much leverage over Russia.
Russia has been pulling out all the stops to achieve its goals. President Putin compared Armenia’s Westward quest to Ukraine’s attempt to achieve Associate status with the EU, which led to the Russian intervention in 2014. Recent investigative reporting by organizations, including Organized Crime and Reporting Project (OCCRP) and The Insider, revealed a sprawling ecosystem of Russian political influence operations targeting Armenia ahead of the vote. Leaked materials outline efforts to shape Armenian public opinion through diaspora mobilization campaigns and coordinated disinformation initiatives aimed at discrediting the Pashinyan Administration and its Civil Contract political party.
The details are revealing. According to the OCCRP, one initiative focused specifically on Armenian voters who hold Russian citizenship, describing them as capable of exerting a “decisive influence” on the election outcome. Other leaked documents reportedly outlined plans to cultivate hostility toward Pashinyan while promoting figures who advocate the closest possible union with Russia. The campaign reportedly extended beyond traditional propaganda, encompassing intelligence activity, influence operations through Kremlin-linked cultural organizations, covert financing networks, and efforts to weaponize religious and nationalist sentiment against the Armenian government.
One damning piece of evidence comes from a recorded video of former ICC prosecutor Luis Ocampo and his son Tomas, who were allegedly using their European network and residual ICC prestige to disrupt European initiatives that would draw Armenia closer to EU institutions and ultimately facilitate Pashinyan’s downfall. According to the videos circulating online, the Ocampos were allegedly using the money of Russian businesspeople of Armenian descent and collaborating with the U.S. Armenian lobby.
The broader objective is clear. Moscow seeks to derail Armenia’s westward trajectory, undermine normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and prevent the emergence of a South Caucasus energy regime integrated into Western and Asian commercial networks outside Russian control.
Inflection Points & Opportunity
What makes this moment unique is that American and Chinese interests overlap, in and beyond energy, far more than either side publicly acknowledges. Washington and Beijing remain strategic competitors, but both benefit from predictability in the Caucasus and beyond, and both lose when Russia injects instability. This dynamic is increasingly evident elsewhere across Eurasia and Africa, where Russian operations undermine French and American long-term commercial and strategic interests, and threaten local African geopolitical stability. Russia utilizes short-term instability to essentially loot developing countries to prop up its own beleaguered economy, which is dragged down by sanctions.
Geopolitics often produces uncomfortable alignments. During the Cold War, the United States partnered with authoritarian regimes, such as Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua and Mobutu Sese Seko in then-Zaire, to contain Soviet expansion, often generating backlash. Today, Washington faces a different reality in the South Caucasus. China is a competitor, but Russia’s model of disruption, coercion, and managed instability creates immediate obstacles to American energy security, European diversification, and regional connectivity.
China, the United States, and Europe face a rare opportunity in which shared self-interest can drive cooperation, consolidate a fragile peace, promote confidence-building among the world’s great powers, and, hopefully, avoid a return to the depths of Cold War-era competition.
The United States, China, Europe, and numerous energy firms, such as BP, SOCAR, TotalEnergies, Eni, ExxonMobil, and Chevron, therefore have direct strategic interests in the outcome of Armenia’s forthcoming elections. If Russian destabilization and disinformation initiatives succeed, global energy markets, already battered by the crisis at the Strait of Hormuz, will take another hit. If Russian initiatives fail, the energy interests of Europe, China, and the United States will be better secured.
Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesleyhill/2026/05/30/energy-competition-and-cooperation-meet-at-the-south-caucasus/
